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Abstract
The Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland is protected by the Agreement. One of the princi-
ples to which both Sinn Fein and the Progressive Unionist Party agreed in 1997 was that they gave
their “total and absolute commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.”
It is important for a U.S. audience to understand that those of us in Ireland who are concerned
to maintain certain basic norms of representative democracy have good reasons to insist on the
principle of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, regardless of who the weapons are
held by, or for what motive. But if one of the parties in a coalition has an association with a
paramilitary organization that is refusing in principle to disarm itself that party is likely to rely in
its coalition negotiations on something more than just the weight of votes that it has in the Dail.
A party associated with a paramilitary organization has, at all times, an extra lever in negotiations
because a paramilitary organization is an organization that has held onto the means to use violence
to achieve its ends.
WHY DECOMMISSIONING IS A REAL ISSUE
John Bruton TD*
The Good Friday Agreement (or "Agreement") is framed in
such a way that it will only work if both Unionists and National-
ists agree to operate it. Everything about the Agreement re-
quires the consent of both communities. The First Minister
comes from one community and the Deputy First Minister from
the other. If either the First Minister or the Deputy First Minis-
ter ceases to hold office, whether by resignation or otherwise,
the other shall also cease to hold office. This key provision
means that everything must be done by agreement.
The Agreement contains radical measures to ensure that
both communities are happy with the way that it is working. The
cross-community voting rules are highly sophisticated and guar-
antee that both communities accept every decision. In addition,
the North/South body has great potential. It gives a political
signal that will allow businesses, voluntary organizations, and
others to work together on an all island basis in a way that was
never possible before because of the political division that ex-
isted.
The Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland is protected
by the Agreement. It is important to recognize also that, if the
political or religious balance in Northern Ireland were to
change, the same institutional arrangements that now provide
protection for the Nationalist minority would similarly provide a
protection in future for a Unionist minority if that were ever to
happen.
The work that led to this Agreement goes back a long way.
The recognition in 1980 that a solution could only be found by
addressing the totality of the relations in and around Northern
Ireland-internally, north/south, and east/west-is put into ef-
fect in the Good Friday Agreement. I do not believe that it is
possible to negotiate a better agreement from the point of view
of anybody.
It would be a tragedy of immense proportions if the current
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difficulty over decommissioning was to prevent the Agreement
from going into effect. So much work by so many people would
be set at nothing. And we would have to start all over again in
most unfavorable circumstances.
I would like to set out why I think that it is important that
the issue of the disarmament of paramilitary organizations be
dealt with once and for all. It is not an issue that can be fudged
over and over again. It must eventually be dealt with, and the
time to deal with it is now. I will also show why the Hillsborough
Declaration is right in saying that putting paramilitary guns and
bombs beyond use is an obligation.
Many Irish people are puzzled by the attitude that is now
being taken by Sinn F~in and the Progressive Unionist Party to
the issue of decommissioning of weapons. The decommission-
ing of weapons is not a problem that has been invented just to
prevent one party entering Government. It is something that
has been at the heart of the negotiations from the very begin-
ning.
On September 24, 1997, a resolution was adopted in the
talks, and accepted by both Sinn Fain and the Progressive
Unionist Party, to the effect that "the resolution of the decom-
missioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negoti-
ation." Prior to that both Sinn F6in and the Progressive Unionist
Party had signed up to the Mitchell Principles in order to partici-
pate in the talks. These principles were drawn up by Sen.
George Mitchell in order to allow the negotiations to start on an
inclusive basis, but without decommissioning having com-
menced beforehand.
To get over that issue, Senator Mitchell proposed that all of
the parties agree to six principles of non-violence. One of the
principles to which both Sinn Fain and the Progressive Unionist
Party agreed in 1997 was that they gave their "total and absolute
commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary or-
ganisations." That was absolutely clear. In signing up to the
Mitchell Principles, Sinn Fain were giving their "total and abso-
lute commitment" to the disarmament of the IRA. The Progres-
sive Unionist Party were giving their "total and absolute commit-
ment" to the disarmament of the Ulster Volunteer Force. That
was something that they did before the negotiations even
started.
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Then on Good Friday of 1998, both Sinn Fain and the Pro-
gressive Unionist Party reaffirmed their commitment to this in
the Good Friday Agreement. The words in the Good Friday
Agreement to which Sinn Fain and the Progressive Unionist
Party agreed were as follows:
All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the
total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also
confirm their intention to continue to work constructively
and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to
use any influence they may have, to achieve decommissioning
of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorse-
ment in referendums North and South of the agreement and
in the context of the implementation of the overall settle-
ment.'
This means that Sinn F~in and the Progressive Unionist Party
have agreed that they will use all the influence that they have to
achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two
years following the endorsement of the Agreement in the refer-
endum. In other words, both parties agreed that all of the arms
belonging to the IRA, and all of the arms belonging to the UVF,
will be put beyond use by May 1999.
So far neither organization has put any arms at all beyond
use, and we are more than halfway through the two year period.
Furthermore, all the evidence suggests that the IRA and the UVF
now have a position that they will either never disarm, or at best
that they will not even make a start on the first part of fulfilling
their Good Friday Agreement obligation to disarmament until
every other obligation in the Agreement on every other party has
been fulfilled in total. The Loyalists and the Republicans are
asking everybody else to do everything on trust for them, while
they will do nothing at all on trust. Sinn Fin will respond that
they are not the IRA and that all they can do is "work construc-
tively and in good faith" and "use any influence they may have."
They may say that they have tried to get the IRA to start disarm-
ing, have failed, and should not be penalized for that.
There are two difficulties with this position. First, very few
people will believe that Sinn F6in and the IRA are totally sepa-
rate from one another. All the briefing that I received, as
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Taoiseach, suggested to me that there is a common policy direc-
tion of both organizations and that they are interlocked in the
way in which they work. The current Taoiseach has described
them as two sides of the same coin. As in all political move-
ments, there are differences of opinion within the Republican
movement, but they have decided that they will put unity first,
and therefore the line taken by the most militant wing is the line
that is eventually taken by all because unity has been made the
top priority. Second, there is the difficulty that if Sinn F6in, as
they claim, were genuinely separate from the IRA, then they
would have the freedom to disagree with the IRA. Given that
Sinn Fain have already given total commitment to the disarma-
ment of paramilitary organizations, Sinn Fain should therefore
be free to disagree with the IRA, who are refusing to counte-
nance any disarmament. Yet Sinn Fain have not done this. They
have allowed their "total and absolute commitment to disarma-
ment" in the Mitchell Principles, to be overridden by the posi-
tion of the IRA Army Council, who are totally opposed to dis-
armament. If, in practice, they are prepared to set aside their
own solemn commitments in favor of the pronouncements of
the Army Council, then the evidence leads inexorably to the
conclusion that they are not, in practice, independent of the IRA
at all.
It is important for a U.S. audience to understand that those
of us in Ireland who are concerned to maintain certain basic
norms of representative democracy have good reasons to insist
on the principle of the decommissioning of paramilitary weap-
ons, regardless of who the weapons are held by, or for what mo-
tive. In the Republic of Ireland, we frequently have coalition
governments. Every party in the Dfiil is eligible to be part of a
coalition at some stage. In a coalition, parties rely for their ne-
gotiating strength on the size and value of their representation
in the D~iil and on nothing else. The number of votes that they
get in elections determines the number of seats that they have,
and the number and value of seats that they have determines the
amount of influence that they have in the Government. This
works so long as all of the parties are operating on a level playing
field. But if one of the parties in a coalition has an association
with a paramilitary organization that is refusing in principle to
disarm itself that party is likely to rely in its coalition negotiations
on something more than just the weight of votes that it has in
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the Ddil. A party associated with a paramilitary organization has,
at all times, an extra lever in negotiations because a paramilitary
organization is an organization that has held onto the means to
use violence to achieve its ends.
If we accept parties in government that are associated with
paramilitaries that refuse to disarm, then we are accepting that
the paramilitary associate might use or threaten force to en-
hance the negotiating position of the party with which it is asso-
ciated. That is fundamentally undemocratic. I do not believe
that a U.S. Congressman would be happy to be negotiating with
other members of Congress who had the additional leverage of
being able to call on the support of an armed organization.
Such a situation would not be tolerable in a democracy on this
side of the Atlantic. It should not be tolerable in Ireland either.
There is another important reason why the weapons of the
Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organizations should be
put beyond use as part of the peace settlement. These stockpiles
of arms are very large. It is important that they do not fall into
the wrong hands. The arms in question are saleable. Nobody
would want to see those arms being sold to international terror-
ist organizations from the Middle East or somewhere else like
that. Only if the weapons are put beyond use, can we be sure
that they are not going to be sold to organizations that would use
them for international terrorism elsewhere in the world. That
must surely be a concern to the U.S. government.
There is the associated risk that the weapons could, if no
longer being used for a political purpose in Ireland, find their
way into the hands of criminal organizations in Ireland. Organ-
ized crime is a major threat to our civilization. It would be a very
big risk for a democratic government to allow large stockpiles of
arms to exist in its jurisdiction, which were outside its control.
One must also ask the question: if the war is over, what do the
Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries need the guns for? Why
are they so insistent on keeping the guns? Is it because they
want to have the option of returning to violence at some future
stage? If so, then they have not accepted the Good Friday Agree-
ment. The Good Friday Agreement was specifically designed to
put a permanent end to violence. All the signatories to the
Good Friday Agreement accepted that. Therefore, it is not rea-
sonable for them to argue that the paramilitary organization
should continue in existence indefinitely after the Good Friday
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Agreement has been fulfilled in all other respects. That is why
decommissioning must be dealt with in accordance with the
commitments to the Mitchell Principles, and with the terms of
the Good Friday Agreement, which specifically provide for
decommissioning.
